Jerry Fodor has charged that Fred Dretske's account of content suffers from indeterminacy to the extent that we should reject it in favor of Fodor‘s own account. In this paper, we ask what the problem of indeterminacy really is; we distinguish a relatively minor problem we call ‘looseness of fit’ from a major problem of failing to show how to point to what is not there. We sketch Dretske's account of content and how it is supposed to solve the major (...) problem. After presenting Fodor's challenge as the claim that Dretske has failed to solve the major problem, we articulate a response available to Dretske. Although we do not think the response is ultimately successful, we argue that it is every bit as good as the response Fodor has offered to a similar challenge, in his so-called ‘mixed theory.’ The upshot is this: despite advertisements to the contrary, Fodor's theory, in its mixed version, offers no real advantages over Dretske's regarding the serious problem of indeterminacy. (shrink)

Saul Kripke recently has published an interpretation of the later Wittgenstein's rule-following problem as a "sceptical paradox," the conclusion of which is that language is impossible. In this dissertation, I document the history of the rule-following problem in Wittgenstein's writings, thereby providing a historical perspective not provided by Kripke. In chapters I and II, I develop a broadly Kantian interpretation of the epistemology of the Tractatus. My interpretation conflicts both with interpretations according to which the Tractatus implicitly embodies an empiricist (...) epistemology or no epistemology at all and with idealist readings. In chapter III, I extend the comparison between Wittgenstein and Kant, arguing that there is an important sense in which the notion of thought is fundamental in the Tractatus. My interpretation conflicts with interpretations according to which the Tractarian theory of meaning requires a mental act of "dubbing" which correlates signs and objects as well as with interpretations according to which nothing mental is presupposed. On one hand, chapters I-III can be read independently of chapters IV and V as an interpretation of some aspects of the Tractatus. On the other hand, these chapters lay the groundwork for my argument in chapter IV that the rule-following problem in the Philosophical Investigations is a general and forceful restatement of the problem of an infinite regress of interpretations to which the Tractarian theory of meaning was supposed to provide a solution. For various reasons, which I recount, Wittgenstein became dissatisfied with his early answer, and the problem reappears in his later work. Finally, in chapter V, I present and evaluate Kripke's interpretation of the rule-following problem from the historical perspective developed in the preceding chapters. I suggest that Kripke fails to see that it is a carry-over of a problem with which Wittgenstein wrestled in the Tractatus. In addition, although he recognizes that the later Wittgenstein believes that no fact or process could account for our ability to represent the world, he does not show clearly why Wittgenstein believes that this is so. (shrink)

That Wittgenstein in the Tractatus likens logic to geometry has been noticed; however, the extent and force of the analogy he develops between logical form and a broadly Kantian account of geometry has not been sufficiently appreciated. In this paper, I trace Wittgenstein's analogy in detail by looking closely at the relevant texts. I then suggest that we regard the fact that Wittgenstein develops his account of logical form by analogy with a Kantian account of geometry as evidence for the (...) bold thesis that Wittgenstein belongs within a Kantian epistemological tradition. Finally, I supply two small pieces of the interpretive puzzle needed to support the larger thesis: first, evidence that Wittgenstein's concern with logical form involves a crucial epistemological component; second, a sketch of how Wittgenstein's account of logical and mathematical knowledge can be viewed as continuing a Kantian tradition. (shrink)